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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO  
AGAM-P (M) (30 Dec 66) FOR OT RD

9 January 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned - 2d Howitzer  
Battalion 35th Artillery

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned from Headquarters, 2d Howitzer Battalion 35th Artillery for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

1 Incl  
Oper Rpt - Lessons  
Learned - 2d How Bn 35th Arty

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 2D HOWITZER BATTALION 35TH ARTILLERY  
APO U.S. Forces 96257

AVAC-V

31 July 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Reports for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,  
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer  
23d Artillery Group  
ATTN: AVGE-C  
APO 96289

Commanding General  
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery  
ATTN: AVXFA-C  
APO 96227

Commanding General  
United States Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVC-DH  
APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief  
United States Army Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-MH  
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

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FOR OT RD  
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## SECTION I

### 1. (C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

#### a. (U) Administration/Personnel.

An Augmentation of six additional forward observer parties, consisting of six officers and twelve enlisted men and a meteorology section consisting of one warrant officer and seventeen enlisted men were authorized by 5th Army CO 80 dated 20 April 1966. The observer parties and one WO and seven enlisted men of the meteorology section arrived after the completion of training. As of this report the Metro section has not received any additional personnel and remains under strength. Three metro readings a day are taken; additional personnel are required to take four readings a day which is the standard position.

#### b. (U) Intelligence.

During preparation for movement and movement overseas, the S-2 section was hindered by lack of knowledge of where the unit was deploying. This did not permit precise area orientation or map/terrain studies. Further the Confidential classification that the unit was deploying to Vietnam was not practical. Families of personnel and most military agencies at Fort Carson knew and openly talked of units deploying to Vietnam. It is recommended that the destination of units deploying to Vietnam not be classified because doing so nullifies the value of security classifications. Instead the Army could refuse as it now does to publicly announce a unit's destination until the unit departs.

#### c. (U) Training.

At the time the battalion was alerted it had approximately thirty percent of its personnel in a deployable status and was operating rifle ranges for basic training. Training problems that occurred were minimal except with a personnel fill of 11 March 1966 only five weeks of unit training could be given before equipment processing began. Shipboard training was planned with appropriate training aids and instructions but due to very limited space, the training was impossible to institute.

#### d. (C) Operations.

(1) The 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery was stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado when it was alerted on 10 January 1966 for a category A move. The battalion, organized under TOE 6-425D, was a 5th US Army unit attached to the 5th Infantry Division (Mech). The unit's last Annual General Inspection was in April 1965, when it attained a rating of excellent. The last battalion Army Training Test was taken in September 1965. Prior to its alert, the battalion was primarily involved in supervising rifle qualification ranges for Basic Combat Trainees.



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(2) When the battalion was alerted, it had 45% of its authorized strength. Initially, the alert called for a personnel readiness date of 31 March but in February the date was changed to 24 May. The equipment readiness date was established as 8 May.

(3) A difficulty arose in re-determining deployable personnel and obtaining the required personnel fill when the ready dates were changed. On 11 March the battalion received 260 AIT fillers from Fort Sill which brought the strength of the battalion up to greater than 90%. Much of the two month period between the alert and the arrival of these men is regarded as wasted time. A considerable amount of effort was expended on a comprehensive training program and a number of classes were presented at the classroom level. However, such classes were frequently attended by only a dozen or so men, most of whom were senior NCO's already familiar with the material, or non-deployable persons.

(4) On 21 March an intensified 5 week unit training program was initiated. A battalion ATT was taken 13-14 April and passed satisfactorily. At this date only 3½ weeks had passed since the beginning of the training program, but the test had to be taken at this time because the unit's equipment had to start processing. Nevertheless, 3½ weeks was barely sufficient for basic unit training and was not sufficient for advanced unit training.

(5) A great deal of planning was carried out during the January - February period in such areas as unit SOP's, shipping and packing requirements, and a training program. Most of these plans were changed because of the change in movement dates, and personnel and equipment augmentation. However, there was certainly some value in these plans because they provided a basis for later changes.

(6) On 30 January a number of new or supplementary items of equipment were requested, such as the new family of radios and tracked vehicles for the FDCs. Although some of these were eventually issued, they did not arrive in time to be used in our training. This caused some inconvenience but did not seriously impair the training program because many items - e.g. M-79 grenade launchers were borrowed for training purposes.

(7) Excellent guidance and assistance was provided by Post Maintenance in the processing of major pieces of equipment for shipment. However, directives concerning the packing and shipping of miscellaneous gear often seemed confusing or misleading. Notably, we expected to have Red TAT available for use immediately upon our arrival incountry, but this was not the case. It arrived six days after our arrival. Our overall experience indicates that a considerable margin of safety should be allowed in packing, since much of the material was roughly handled by the time it reached us. Also three Conex inserts have never been received.

(8) A serious difficulty arose in trying to obtain extra supplies and equipment for the move to Vietnam. Copies of numerous letters and helpful hints were received by our battalion from units in Vietnam.

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Most hints were unanimous in stating that extra supplies should be brought to Vietnam but no CONUS agency would go ahead and take any responsibility in authorizing the battalion to take extra supplies or non-government items deemed very necessary by units in Vietnam. Examples: 180 days of expendables, extra generators, washing machines, fans, small refrigerators, and lumber. The battalion sent most of these items to Vietnam without specific permission.

(9) The time from 10 January 1966, until equipment load-out on 18 May 1966, was spent bringing the unit up to TO&E strength with deployable personnel, training, and receiving new equipment. Also, during this period, a readiness test exercise, Command Material Maintenance Inspection, an Operational Readiness Inspection, a Battalion Army Training Test, and a 5th Army Technical Proficiency Inspection were administered. After the equipment was loaded out, all personnel who hadn't had leave were allowed a fifteen day leave. The battalion departed home station in two increments: The main body, leaving 26 May 1966, by train, and the other, an advance party of two hundred and five, flying out the next day to Oakland, California arriving at 0730 hours the 27th of May 1966.

(10) The 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery departed CONUS by ship (USNS General Walker) on the 28th Day of May 1966. Crowded conditions made most of the plans for shipboard training unworkable. Morale suffered somewhat due to general boredom and poor living conditions for the enlisted men.

(11) An advance party from this battalion was airlifted to Vietnam and landed in-country on 13 June. The party consisted of three officers, two warrant officers, six supply sergeants, six drivers and seven S-4 personnel.

(12) The battalion arrived at Qui Nhon, Vietnam 16 June 1966. It debarked at Vung Tau 23 June 1966 and went to a staging area (Coordinate XT 996 149) near the Bien Hoa Airbase. Service Battery, 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery moved from the staging area to it's base camp on 1 July 1966 (Coordinate YT 052 112).

(13) The battalion's equipment was shipped from Beaumont Texas, on the 19th of May 1966. The ship (Shelton Lykes) arrived in Vietnam at the port of Cam Ranh Bay on 22 June 1966. Equipment commenced to be unloaded on 23 June and by 25 June all equipment was on the ground. It took more than a week, until the 4th of July 1966, for the battalion to receive part of it's equipment at the Saigon Port. This consisted of (10) ten Howitzers and three (3) M-577A1 C.P. tracks. The rest of the equipment which included all of the wheel vehicles and the remaining howitzers did not arrive until 15-16 July 1966.

(14) The battalion fired it's first round in-country on 11 July 1966. On 19 July 1966, Headquarters, B and C Batteries moved into a base camp at Xuan Loc, Vietnam at Coordinates 473 097, 473 098 and 473 095 respectively. This element was operational on that date in General support/

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Reinforcing of the 10th ARVN Division. "A" Battery moved to it's base camp at Nui Dat (Coordinate YS 428 665) on 22 July and was operational on that date in General Support/Reinforcing of the 1st Australian Task Force.

(15) Since the start of firing on 11 July 1966, the battalion has fired 563 missions and expended 3,399 rounds.

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## SECTION II

### 1. (U) Section 2, Part 1, Observation (Lessons Learned)

#### a. Personnel

##### (1) Profile Personnel (Medical).

(a) Item: Early identification of personnel not medically deployable.

(b) Discussion: Finding personnel with a Profile 3 in hearing near the end of the training program necessitated reassigning a chief of firing battery and four howitzer section chiefs with the associated problem of getting replacements. These replacements were unable to train with the unit.

(c) Observation: Physical examinations should be immediately required when a unit receives initial deployment instructions.

##### (2) Personnel section.

(a) Item: Unit personnel section.

(b) Discussion: A full strength personnel section has difficulty processing incoming and outgoing records of a battalion sized unit.

(c) Observation: Utilizing an organic, full strength personnel section for deployable personnel and a temporary personnel augmentation for nondeployables, a more efficient processing of personnel and financial records prior to deployment could be attained.

##### (3) Augmentation.

(a) Item: Forward Observer and Metro Sections.

(b) Discussion: Augmenting a battalion when training is almost finished is unworkable, both for unit esprit and because of the personnel problems involved.

(c) Observation: It would be easier for all concerned if augmentation was decided ahead of time and personnel arrived on station in time to train with a unit. If this can't be accomplished, the augmentation could be sent to the unit at a later date by air so that personnel can be fully trained.

#### b. Operations.

##### (1) Calibration.

(a) Item: Calibration of Howitzers.

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(b) Discussion: Noncalibration of weapons requires in-country calibration with ammunition that could be put to better use.

(c) Observation: Complete calibration in all charges prior to departure from CONUS.

## (2) Advance Party.

(a) Item: Increased number of personnel.

(b) Discussion: A twenty four men advance party for a non-divisional artillery battalion is insufficient for liaison, coordination and logistical requisitioning.

(c) Observation: Increasing the advance party to include battery officers, administrative and logistical personnel, as well as a detail section, to include cooks, could relieve pressure placed on other units in country.

## c. Training and Organization.

## d. Intelligence.

### Maps.

(a) Item: Early receipt of maps.

(b) Discussion: Receipt of maps just prior to departure does not give sufficient time for complete inventory and distribution.

(c) Observation: Early receipt of maps would insure final distribution prior to departure and would enable advance party to have maps available on arrival in-country. This would also enable subordinate units to study the maps aboard ship.

## e. Logistics

### (1) Clothing and Equipment.

(a) Item: Review of required items.

(b) Discussion: On arrival in-country, winter sleeping bags, rocket launchers and camouflage nets were turned in.

(c) Observation: Turn in of above mentioned items and possibly other items in CONUS would reduce weight and space requirements. Some difficulty was experienced in trying to establish what would be minimum essential equipment. More guidance or earlier guidance by the theater would be valuable.

### (2) GP Medium Tents.

(a) Item: Augment GP, medium tents.

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(b) Discussion: Unit deployed with inadequate GP medium tents to properly house the personnel in each battery. Up to sixteen men are housed in one tent.

(c) Observation: More than twelve men per tent presents highly uncomfortable living conditions. Units deploying should be issued tentage based upon 1 GP tent per 12 assigned personnel.

## (3) Commo Equipment.

(a) Item: Installation kits.

(b) Discussion: Installation kits for radios to be mounted in the M577 CP track, have never arrived.

(c) Observation: Just prior to load-out, the unit received the M577 vehicle. The M577 arrived minus installation kit for radios. Requisition was phoned in immediately and then requisitioned again in Vietnam. Installation kits have not been received.

## (4) Spiral 4 cable.

(a) Item: Additional cable.

(b) Discussion: The unit is not authorized spiral cable for internal and external wire lines.

(c) Observation: The VC do not cut cable as frequently as field wire.

## (5) Requisitions.

(a) Item: Outstanding requisitions.

(b) Discussion: Many requisitions were submitted in CONUS prior to move out.

(c) Observation: No equipment which was on requisition when unit deployed has reached this unit in Vietnam.

## (6) Red TAT.

(a) Item: Red TAT to be immediately available upon arrival in-country.

(b) Discussion: Red TAT is equipment that is packed to be of immediate use once in-country, such as kitchen equipment, small arms ammunition, mosquito bars and nets, etc.

(c) Observation: If this equipment cannot accompany troops into staging areas, these items should be made available from an in-country pool and issued from some central location instead of borrowing from other units who also have a need for these items.

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## (7) Additional Supplies and Equipment.

(a) Item: Extra supplies and equipment in addition to TO&E equipment.

(b) Discussion: Information received from Vietnam prior to the unit's move advised bringing extra expendables, blank forms, lumber, nails, refrigerators, fans, small generators, etc.

(c) Observation: It would help all concerned if some central agency would authorize a post or base to ship extra expendables and special items with an outgoing unit. They could also authorize shipping of certain privately owned equipment, i.e., refrigerators, fans, sewing machines, generators, etc.

f. Other.

## 2. (U) Section 2, Part II, Recommendations.

a. Each unit should bring ten (10) miles of spiral-four cable for internal and external wire lines.

b. Antennas and handsets for radios be secured in banded Conex inserts when shipped.

c. There should be a central location in each major port where all in-coming ships to Vietnam, plus a listing of cargo by unit is posted. This location plus it's telephone number should be disseminated to all incoming units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SAMUEL KRANE  
1st Lt, Arty  
Adjutant

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AVGE-C (10 Aug 66)


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SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,  
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96289, US Forces, 13 August 1966

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO US Forces 96227

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery is adequate.
2. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2a. Due to the difficulty in splicing and maintenance of spiral-four cable at the battalion level, this recommendation is not favorably considered by this Headquarters.
3. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2b. Concur.
4. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2c. A central agency should exist that provides all necessary information on incoming ships.
5. (U) This page regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from basic document.

THOMAS H. SAYES  
Colonel, Artillery  
CommandingRegraded UNCLASSIFIED When Separated  
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2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,  
RCS-CSFOR (U)

DA, HQ, II FFORCEV Arty, APO 96266 AUG 29 1966

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

1. (U) The Operational Report for the quarterly period 1 May - 31 July 1966 submitted by the 2d How Bn, 35th Artillery is considered adequate.

2. (C) The following comments are made on the problem areas/recommendations discussed in the report:

a. Ref Section I, para 1a. The shortage of ten meteorology personnel affects the ability of the unit to operate for a 24 hour period. On a recent operation, personnel were provided from one of the other battalions in II FFORCEV Artillery in order to permit the section to perform its mission.

b. Ref Section I, para 1b. Nonconcur. The fact that unauthorized personnel at the unit's home station knew of the unit's destination only reflects a need for better protection of classified information. This headquarters has a program of furnishing units with necessary data on their specific area of deployment by classified correspondence.

c. Ref Section II, Part 1, para 1b(2). Nonconcur. The size of the advance party sent by this unit is considered adequate. Space for battery officers and administrative personnel could have been made by reducing the unnecessarily large numbers of supply personnel and drivers which this unit placed in its advance party.

d. Ref Section II, Part 1, para 1d. The unit received its supply of maps in sufficient time; however, they were all packed in Conex containers and shipped. The lesson learned here is that units deploying should retain sufficient maps for study or use on the trip over.

e. Ref Section II, Part 1, para 1e(2). Concur.

f. Ref Section II, Part 1, para 1e(3). This headquarters will determine what can be done to provide assistance in this matter.

g. Ref Section II, Part 1, para 1e(5). The unit will be requested to furnish a list of items not received and actions taken to follow up on the requisitions. A determination can then be made as to the assistance which is needed.

i. Ref Section II, Part 1, para 1e(6). Concur. This was one of the recommendations in letter, AVFB-FAC, this headquarters, dated 14 August 1966, subject, Operational Report - Lessons Learned.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****AVFB-FAC****SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,  
RCS-CSFOR (U)**

i. Ref Section II, Part 2, para 2a. Nonconcur. Spiral four cable is available if absolutely needed; however, the unit is not equipped to maintain and service the cable.

j. Ref Section II, Part 2, para 2b. Concur. No action is required by this headquarters.

k. Ref Section II, Part 2, para 2c. Port Operations in Saigon handles this information now.

*George R. Allin, Jr.*  
**GEORGE R. ALLIN, JR.**  
Colonel, Artillery  
Acting Commander

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AVFBC-H (31 Jul 66)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 20 SEP 1966

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVC-DH, APO 96307

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96588

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(U) The Operational Report for Period Ending 31 July 1966 submitted by the 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery, as indorsed, is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROBERT L. ALDERMAN  
Major, AGC  
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DH (31 July 1966) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

3 NOV 1966

TO: Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-OT  
APO 96558

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery for the quarter ending 31 July 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. Concur with the comments contained in the basic report and the previous indorsements, except as indicated in paragraph 5 below.

3. Reference Section 1, Paragraph 1a: There are personnel on requisition to cover the shortages.

4. Reference Section II, Part 1, Paragraph 1e(2): TA 50-901 states that 16 men can be accommodated in a general purpose, medium tent. In RVN the establishment of base camps, which are semi-fixed installations, requires more space for each individual and his equipment.

5. Reference Section II, Part 1, Paragraph 1e(6)(c): Nonconcur in the establishment of a central pool. If red disc TAT is unavailable upon a unit's arrival, supply action can be accomplished by respective in-country support commands to make available non-expendable items on a loan basis.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. J. THORNTON  
1st Lt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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GPOP-OT(31 Jul 66)

5th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Reports for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966  
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65


HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

23 NOV 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D. A. HARRISON  
Capt, AGC  
Asst AG

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